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Dismantling The Exclusionary Rule: United
States v. Leon and the Courts of
Washington-Should Good Faith Excuse Bad
Acts?
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, when the government has obtained evidence
by a method that violates the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution, that illegally obtained evidence has been
excluded from use in both state and federal criminal prosecu-
tions.' This exclusionary rule has been the sanction employed to
enforce the fourth amendment right of citizens to be secure in
their homes against unreasonable intrusions by the government;'
without enforcement, the fourth amendment right is an empty
promise.3 The exclusionary rule, however, has come under
increasing scrutiny and criticism in recent years.4 The Supreme
Court has developed a fourth amendment jurisprudence that
greatly limits the application of the rule by narrowly construing
its purpose. The rule has come to be regarded solely as a method
by which to deter illegal police conduct.5 Thus, the Court now
excludes illegally obtained evidence only when exclusion will
deter police misconduct. Increasingly, the Court discounts or
entirely ignores the other policy interests the exclusionary rule
1. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 164 at 445 (3rd ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK].
2. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 645 (1960) (The state of Ohio asserted that
evidence seized in violation of a federal constitutional right could be used in a state
prosecution; the Supreme Court ruled that unconstitutionally seized evidence should be
excluded from state as well as federal prosecutions).
3. Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizures Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365,
1389 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Stewart, The Road to Mapp].
4. See, e.g., the South Texas Law Journal Symposium Issue on the Exclusionary
Rule Debate, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 527 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40 (1979) (where officer makes
arrest pursuant to an ordinance later found to be unconstitutional, officer's reliance on
ordinance is not conduct the rule is designed to deter); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
531, 538-39 (1975) (deterrence function of exclusionary rule does not require retroactive
application of a stricter probable cause standard developed by the court after the search
and arrest at issue has occurred).
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has been thought to protect."
One way in which the Supreme Court has limited applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule is through its recent adoption, in
United States v. Leon,7 of a good faith exception. Even when
viewed in light of the Court's growing reluctance to apply the
exclusionary rule, the good faith exception represents a dramatic
retreat from the rule's historical justifications.8 Traditional pol-
icy objectives have included deterring, on a system-wide basis,
violations of the fourth amendment's privacy guarantee,9 pre-
serving judicial integrity,10 and carrying out the mandate of the
fourth amendment." Now, after Leon, evidence obtained
6. See Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); see also Stewart, The
Road to Mapp, supra note 3, at 1390-92.
7. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1983). Justice White wrote for the majority; Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens dissented.
8. By the mid-1970s, a majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court were unwill-
ing to support any further expansion of the exclusionary rule. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 494 (1976) (the rule does not extend to certain federal habeas corpus proceedings);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976) (the rule is not applicable in federal
civil tax proceedings); Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (the rule is not
applied in grand jury proceedings). The Court in these decisions and in others, see supra
note 5, narrowed its focus to the deterrence rationale and developed a cost/benefit analy-
sis for determining the value of applying the exclusionary rule.
In Stone, Janis, and Calandra, the Court had effectively halted expansion of the
rule's application to new areas of judicial proceedings. Leon represents a retreat from
prior case law because the Court creates an exception to the customary and accepted
application of the rule. "Today, for the first time, this Court holds that although the
Constitution has been violated, no court should do anything about it at any time and in
any proceeding." Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3456 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 382, 399-401 (1981).
See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1964).
10. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. at 659; MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 168 at 462.
11. The phrase "carrying out the mandate of the fourth amendment" is adopted
here to represent those purposes of the rule that are not uniformly recognized or
accepted. Some Justices and commentators have identified the value of the rule as a
personal remedy that puts the criminal defendant in the position he would have been in
had a violation of his rights not occurred. See, e.g., Stewart, The Road to Mapp, supra
note 3, at 383-84; MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 168 at 462-63. Some commentators have
claimed that the exclusionary rule serves the broad purpose of assuring all potential vic-
tims of fourth amendment violations that the state will not profit from its own lawless-
ness. LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.1 at 80 (1985). It has also been sug-
gested, as a matter of state law, that the state is morally obligated to prohibit the use of
illegally obtained evidence. When exclusion is regarded as a "moral imperative" the rule
is applied automatically, without reference to any pragmatic justification. See State v.
White, 97 Wash. 2d 93, 108-12, 640 P.2d 1061, 1070-71 (1982) ("Without an immediate
application of the exclusionary rule whenever an individual's right to privacy is unrea-
sonably invaded, the protections of the Fourth Amendment and Const. art. 1, § 7 are
seriously eroded."). See Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article 1,
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through the use of an illegal search warrant will not be excluded
under the fourth amendment if the officers acted in objectively
reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral and
detached magistrate. 2 The fourth amendment requires that
search warrants be based on probable cause and that the area to
be searched and things to be seized be adequately described. A
violation of these requirements no longer suffices to exclude ille-
gally obtained evidence.13 This decision is significant because
Leon and the line of cases on which it rests define a sharp shift
in the Court's direction." The inquiry no longer is whether the
fourth amendment was violated,15 but whether the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule outweighs the potential cost of
losing valuable evidence.1 "
State courts that continue to regard the rule's primary pur-
pose as the protection of personal privacy interests need not and
should not follow the Supreme Court's policy of restricting
application of the exclusionary rule when these state courts
interpret state law.17 Each state has its own constitutional provi-
sion that historically has been understood to protect the same
types of interests that the fourth amendment protects."s Inde-
Section 7, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 331, 370 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Nock, Seizing
Opportunity]; Adams & Nock, Search, Seizure and Washington's Section 7: Standing
from Salvucci to Simpson, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 26-28 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Adams & Nock, Salvucci to Simpson. This moral imperative purpose is distinguished
from the rule as a personal remedy by being applied without any pragmatic justification.
Finally, Justice Brennan suggests in his dissent in Leon, in which he was joined by Jus-
tice Marshall, that the admission of illegally obtained evidence constitutes a new viola-
tion of the fourth amendment. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3433. Therefore, application of the
exclusionary rule serves the purpose of protecting individuals from new violations as well
as from consequences of previous violations. See also Nock, Seizing Opportunity, supra,
at 370-371.
12. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3405.
13. Id. The Leon Court accepted the finding of the district court, which said that"probable cause to issue the warrant was lacking." Id. at 3439 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In a companion case to Leon, the Supreme Court ruled that failure of a warrant to accu-
rately particularize the things to be seized should not trigger the exclusionary rule where
officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on that warrant. Massachusetts v. Shep-
pard, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 3428 (1984).
14. See supra note 8.
15. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412. See also id. at 3430-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
majority ignores the fundamental constitutional importance of what is at stake here.").
16. Id. at 3412.
17. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 495-501 (1977). See also Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States'
Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 383-84 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Linde, First
Things First]; see also infra note 119.
18. The Alaska constitution, for example, uses language nearly identical to that of
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pendent interpretation of these state constitutional provisions
can provide citizens with greater protections than are available
to them under the federal constitution."9 Specifically, state
courts are free to promote the several purposes served by appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule in light of their own constitu-
tional guarantees. 20
In Washington State, the trend toward providing individu-
als with greater protection under state law is well established.21
Thus, the Washington Constitution's privacy provision, article I,
section 7,22 will not support a "good faith" exception such as the
one created by the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon.
Although the issue has not been expressly decided by the state
supreme court, the court's general commitment to the protection
of privacy rights23 and its specific rejection of the deterrence
rationale as the sole justification for application of the exclusion-
ary rule compel this conclusion.2 4
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and other prop-
erty, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated. No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14. The Virginia Constitution uses similar language:
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to
search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any
person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described
and supported by evidence, are grevious and oppressive, and ought not to be
granted.
VA. CONST. art. I, § 10. See also Ariz. Const. art. II, §§ 4, 8; Cal. Const. art. I, § 13; Mich.
Const. art. I, § 11; Mo. Const. art. I, § 15; N.J. Const. art. I, § 7; N.Y. Const. art. 1 § 12;
Tex. Const. art. I, § 9.
19. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 166 at 452-55.
20. Id. at 453.
21. See also infra notes 23 & 24.
22. Article I, section 7 provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs,
or his home invaded, without authority of law."
23. State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 435-37, 688 P.2d 136, 138-39 (1984) (Agui-
lar-Spinelli test for probable cause required in Washington even though test rejected by
Supreme Court) ; State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 817-19, 676 P.2d 419, 422 (1984)
(article I, section 7 prohibits police from entering dormitory room to inspect possible
contraband observed from outside room); State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 690-99, 674
P.2d 1240, 1242-47 (1983) (court limited scope of motor vehicle search incident to arrest
to the person arrested and the area within his immediate control); State v. Simpson, 95
Wash. 2d 170, 177, 622 P.2d 1199, 1204-05 (1980) (police violated driver's reasonable
expectation of privacy by opening door to read vehicle identification number); State v.
Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 47, 578 P.2d 527, 528 (1978) (full custody arrest for minor
traffic offense was improper where defendant was willing to sign the promise to appear).
24. State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d at 109-12, 640 P.2d at 1070 (stop-and-identify stat-
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This Note will review briefly the history of the exclusionary
rule under fourth amendment jurisprudence, with special
emphasis given to the purposes the rule has traditionally been
thought to serve. The significance of the Leon decision then will
be examined in light of the emergence in Washington of an
interpretation of article I, section 7 that diverges from the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the fourth amendment. This
Note will conclude by discussing how article I, section 7 contin-
ues to embody the several purposes traditionally served by the
exclusionary rule.2
II. HISTORY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The fourth amendment does not explicitly require exclusion
of illegally obtained evidence. 6 At common law, the legality of
the method of obtaining evidence was unrelated to the admissi-
bility of that evidence.2" In 1886, the Supreme Court laid the
foundation for the exclusionary rule in Boyd v. United States.28
ute held unconstitutional and exclusionary rule applied to evidence seized during stop
made pursuant to statute).
25. This analysis is limited to a consideration of the constitutional provision. Stat-
utes and administrative laws, which are also important sources of a citizen's protection
against unreasonable governmental intrusions, are not examined. See, e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.79 (1983) (specific procedures and standards police and magistrates must fol-
low in obtaining the issuing warrant, and the conduct required by officers acting without
authority of warrant); WASH. REV. CODE § 66.32 (1983) (search and seizure of alcoholic
beverages); WASH. CRR. 2.3; WASH. JCRR. 2.10 (guidelines for issuance, contents, and
execution of search warrants).
26. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV. The fourth amendment does not explicitly demand that evidence
be excluded. The framers' intent in creating and passing the fourth amendment was
principally to prevent the government's use of either general warrants or of writs of
assistance. Kamisar, Does (did)(should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" rather than an "Empirical Proposition"? 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 577 (1982-
83) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar, Principled Basis).
27. [T]hough papers and other subjects of evidence may have been illegally
taken from the possession of the party against whom they are offered, or other-
wise unlawfully obtained, this is no valid objection to their admissibility if they
are pertinent to the issue. The court will not take notice how they were
obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it form an issue to determine
that question.
S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 254(a), at 325 (14th ed. 1883).
28. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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In Boyd, the Court struck down a section of a Customs and Rev-
enue law that compelled the production of a businessman's pri-
vate papers. 9 The Court held that the seizure of the papers was
unconstitutional because their use in evidence violated the
merchant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination."0
Although Boyd was a civil case with no clear fourth amend-
ment violation,31 the Court articulated a principle of construc-
tion that set the stage for the exclusionary rule and the rule's
application to federal criminal prosecutions. The Boyd Court
observed that unconstitutional practices often begin as only
slight deviations from accepted procedures.32 To guard against
these infractions, the constitutional provisions for the security of
person and property must be construed liberally.3 This princi-
ple of liberal construction formed the foundation for creation of
the exclusionary rule twenty-eight years later in the landmark
case of Weeks v. United States.4
In Weeks, a United States Marshall who had no warrant
either for the arrest of Mr. Weeks or for the search of his home
seized evidence from the home in Weeks' absence and without
his consent.3 5 The Court reasoned that if evidence seized in this
manner could be held and used against a defendant, "the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. . . is of no value ... ."3 The
Weeks Court insisted that the fourth amendment puts "the
courts of the United States and Federal officials. . . under limi-
tations and restraints as to the exercise of. . . [their] power and
authority . . . . Therefore, the unanimous Court established
that evidence obtained by federal agents in violation of a
defendant's fourth amendment rights should be excluded in a
29. Id. at 631-32. The amended Act authorized production of business papers in
order to prevent importers from avoiding import taxes.
30. Id. at 632-33.
31. Stewart, The Road to Mapp, supra note 3, at 1372-73.
32. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
33. Id.
34. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Between Boyd and Weeks, the Supreme Court decided
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). The Adams majority, on facts similar to those
in Boyd, found no constitutional violation and seemed to resurrect the common law
notion that courts will not scrutinize the source of competent evidence. Id. at 594. This
case, however, has been characterized as "just a wild turn in the exclusionary rule roller
coaster track." Stewart, The Road to Mapp, supra note 3, at 1374.
35. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386.
36. Id. at 393. The Court went on to declare that so far as Mr. Weeks was con-
cerned, the fourth amendment "might as well be stricken from the Constitution." Id.
37. Id. at 391-92.
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federal criminal prosecution.38
The Weeks decision often is cited as the authority for the
proposition that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of the
fourth amendment.3 9  But regardless of whether the rule is
acknowledged as constitutionally mandated or judicially cre-
ated-by no means a settled question in 1914 or now-the
Weeks decision left some doubt in the minds of federal prosecu-
tors as to the reach of the judicial remedy of exclusion.
Assuming that the Weeks Court was concerned only with
the government's possession of illegally obtained evidence, pros-
ecutors in New York examined some illegally seized papers and
then returned the papers to their owner.40 The owner subse-
quently was subpoenaed and ordered to produce the papers.
This case was brought before the Supreme Court in Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States.41 Justice Holmes, writing for the
Court, rejected the government's distinction between introduc-
ing the evidence that actually was seized unlawfully and other
evidence derived from the unlawful seizure. The fourth amend-
ment forbids the use in federal criminal prosecutions of any evi-
dence obtained illegally by federal officials. 42
The Court in these decisions implicitly rejected any distinc-
tion, for fourth amendment and exclusionary rule purposes,
between prosecutors and police. Neither group is permitted any
advantage from illegally obtained evidence. It was on the basis
38. Id. The Weeks decision did not apply to criminal proceedings in state courts.
The decision also did not apply to evidence used in federal courts if it was seized by
state officers. This latter exception, characterized as the "silver platter" exception was
later eliminated by the Court. Elkins v. United States 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (The
Court held that "evidence obtained by state officers during a search which, if conducted
by federal officers, would have violated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible over the defendant's
timely objection in a federal criminal trial.") The "silver platter" exception was revived
to a degree in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976) (evidence illegally
seized by state officials held admissible in a federal civil tax proceeding).
39. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1960) (exclusionary rule referred to
as the "Weeks rule").
40. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
41. Id.
42. Mr. Justice Holmes left no doubt as to the consequences of accepting the gov-
ernment's proposition: it would reduce the fourth amendment "to a form of words." Id.
at 392. He concluded that the essence of the Weeks decision was that evidence illegally
obtained could not be put to any use. This holding in Silverthorne was later identified as
the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939). This doctrine acknowledged the broad scope of the exclusionary rule as applied
in federal criminal prosecutions.
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of this principle that Justice Holmes, dissenting in Olmstead v.
United States,43 argued that a distinction should not be made
between prosecutors and judges. The Weeks Court overthrew
the common law mandate that courts will take no notice of the
method by which evidence is acquired.44 The holding in Weeks
thus supports Justice Holmes' conclusion: "If the existing code
does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty
business it does not permit the judge to allow such iniquities to
succeed."'45
The common law rule and the Weeks doctrine, as embel-
lished by Silverthorne, suggest two different models of criminal
prosecution. The common law model envisions a fragmented
process in which courts are merely neutral conduits of evi-
dence.40 The most important function of a court under this
model is to ensure a fair trial by bringing before the trier of fact
all the available, reliable evidence.47 The court is separate from
the rest of government. The court's presumed neutrality enables
the judge to admit evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment without condoning the unlawful action of the
police.'8
An alternative model of prosecution is to envision a single
governmental process beginning with arrest or the seizure of evi-
dence and ending with punishment or acquittal. Under such a
unitary model, a court that admits evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment is tainted by that violation and
becomes, in effect, the accomplice of the police.49 Admission of
illegally obtained evidence is, in itself, an independent, separate
43. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
44. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
45. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
46. Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitu-
tional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251, 255-56 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Schrock &
Welsh, Up From Calandra].
47. Id. See also Kamisar, Principled Basis, supra note 26, at 639.
48. Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra, supra note 46, at 256.
49. Id. at 257. The Court from time to time has commented on its understanding of
the integral role courts play in legitimizing the conduct of law enforcement officials: "A
ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial. . . has the necessary effect of legitimizing
the conduct which produced the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule
withholds the constitutional imprimatur." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968). See also,
LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and
Ramifications, U. ILL. L.F. 895, 909-10 (1984) (repeating the above quotation in context
of magistrates issuing warrants and whether the legality-admissibility dichotomy has an
effect on the education of law enforcement officials as to the mandates of the fourth
amendment) [hereinafter cited as LaFave, Rationale and Ramifications].
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violation of an individual's fourth amendment right to be secure
against the unreasonable intrusions of government6 0 The Weeks
and Silverthorne Courts and the dissents in Olmstead, whether
self-consciously or not, created and envisioned the exclusionary
rule in the context of a unitary model of a prosecution.6 In both
Weeks and Silverthorne the Court applied the exclusionary rule
broadly wherever the federal government, courts, or officials vio-
lated the fourth amendment.6 2
The unitary approach to exclusion protects the rights of all
citizens and not merely those who stand accused of crimes.53 A
tension unquestionably exists between a policy of excluding evi-
dence that government officials have obtained unlawfully and
one of bringing every criminal to justice. In imposing limits on
the government's use of tainted evidence, the exclusionary rule
may frustrate prosecution: "The criminal is to go free because
the constable has blundered. ' 54 But the tension is unavoidable
and the choices are clear:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously .... [I]f
the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt forlaw; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare thatthe government may commit crimes in order to secure the con-viction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely
set its face." 6
The language in these early cases illustrates that the exclu-
sionary rule has traditionally been thought to serve more than
one purpose. First, the rule is intended to discourage misconduct
on a system-wide basis. The Silverthorne majority emphasized
that the rule was designed to prevent any use of illegally
obtained evidence, not merely its direct introduction at trial. 6
The Weeks Court spoke explicitly in terms of all federal officials
50. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3433 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra, supra note 46, at 257.
51. Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra, supra note 46, at 298-302 (supports this
assertion as to Weeks only).
52. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
53. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
54. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
55. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
56. Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392.
19861
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and all federal courts.5 7 Under this broad prohibition on the use
of the fruits of present or past misconduct, the rule deters mis-
conduct by removing any governmental benefit and by educating
officials as to the fundamental privacy interests protected by the
fourth amendment.58
Deterring government misconduct, however, even on a sys-
tem-wide basis, is not the only purpose served by the rule. The
Olmstead dissenters suggested a second purpose: preserving
judicial integrity.59 Justice Holmes understood the holding in
Weeks to be a complete rejection of the common law notion that
courts should take no notice of the source of evidence. 0 Justice
Brandeis, borrowing a maxim from the courts of equity, declared
that, "a court will not redress a wrong when he who invokes its
aid has unclean hands." 61 By applying the exclusionary rule, the
judiciary protects itself from becoming or seeming to become a
lawbreaker or an ally of lawbreakers.2 This notion that judicial
integrity is preserved by application of the rule frequently is
cited by courts and commentators as a significant justification
for the rule.63
In 1960 the Supreme Court held in Mapp v. Ohio4 that the
exclusionary rule, as an essential part of the fourth amendment,
is binding on the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.6 5 In so holding, the Court announced
57. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391-92.
58. Stewart, The Road to Mapp, supra note 3, at 1400; see also Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 209 (1960).
59. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 483 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
60. Id. at 470-71 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 485.
63. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); Kamisar, Is the
Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 67 (1978). The Supreme Court never rested application of the
rule entirely on the purpose of promoting judicial integrity and implicitly rejected that
purpose in Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974); see also Stewart, The
Road to Mapp, supra note 3, at 1391.
64. 367 U.S. 643 (1960).
65. Id. The Supreme Court first applied the fourth amendment to state criminal
prosecutions in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In Wolf, the Supreme Court held
that the fourth amendment applied to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 33. The Court, however, specifically refused to apply the
sanction of the exclusionary rule to state criminal prosecutions. Id. The Wolf Court spec-
ulated that the remedy of exclusion was not necessarily the only effective remedy availa-
ble and, therefore, the Court declined to regard the rule as constitutionally mandated.
Id. at 31. The Wolf Court was also reluctant to impose its will on the many states that
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that application of the rule carries out the mandate of the Con-
stitution: "We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same author-
ity, inadmissible in a state court." 6
The application of the exclusionary rule is required in order
to ensure the protection of privacy guaranteed by the fourth
amendment.67 In declaring that the exclusionary rule is constitu-
tionally mandated, the Mapp Court acknowledged the rule's
other purposes:
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to theindividual no more than that which the Constitution guaran-tees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest
law enforcement is entitled, and to the courts, that judicial
integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. 8
Justice Stewart suggested that following the history of the
exclusionary rule is like following a roller coaster track. 9 Thepurposes served by application of the rule have followed a simi-
larly fluctuating history.70 The roller coaster track now may be
said to have flattened out. Since 1974, the Supreme Court has
found but one purpose for the exclusionary rule, a narrowly
defined purpose of deterrence." The consequence is that the
exclusionary rule under federal law is slowly rolling to a stop.
III. United States v. Leon
Justice Brennan, among others, has asserted that the door
to the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule announced
in United States v. Leon 2 was first opened by the Supreme
had not adopted the holding in Weeks. Id. at 28-32.
66. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
67. Id. at 656. There is language in Mapp to support what has recently been identi-fied as the "moral imperative" purpose of the exclusionary rule. See Nock, SeizingOpportunity, supra note 11, at 370. The Mapp Court never explicitly required applica-tion of the exclusionary rule as a moral principle, but the Court did describe the rule asan essential part of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657,which arguably is all the justification a moral principle requires.
68. Id. at 660.
69. Stewart, The Road to Mapp, supra note 3, at 1374.70. For decisions supporting a system-wide deterrence rationale, see Weeks, 252U.S. 383, and Silverthorne, 251 U.S. 385. For decisions emphasizing judicial integrity, seeElkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For adecision asserting that the rule is mandated by the Constitution, see Mapp, 367 U.S. 643
(1960).
71. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 8.
72. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
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Court more than a decade ago in Calandra v. United States."3
The Calandra Court held that the exclusionary rule could not be
invoked by a witness before a grand jury in order to bar ques-
tions based on evidence obtained through an unlawful search
and seizure.74 Although the Calandra Court arguably only
declined to extend the rule and did not retract it, the majority
articulated two important assumptions that radically altered the
analysis of application of the rule.
The first assumption reflects the fragmentary model of pros-
ecution. The Calandra Court stated that the fourth amendment
violation, claimed to have been committed by the grand jury,
had already been committed by the police when they unlawfully
searched Mr. Calandra's offices. 75 The use of the evidence as the
basis for questions put to Mr. Calandra by the grand jury was
therefore derivative and was not in itself a "new" violation of
Mr. Calandra's constitutional rights.7 6 The Court acknowledged
that even such derivative use would be enough to bar such evi-
dence in a criminal trial but not in a grand jury setting." The
Court's distinction between the police and the grand jury thus
insulated the grand jury from any fourth amendment violation.
Once the distinction was made, the Calandra Court was free to
consider whether illegally obtained evidence could be used by a
grand jury as an issue unrelated to the issue of whether the
fourth amendment had been violated.78 The Court used a cost/
benefit analysis to determine whether the cost to society of
excluding the illegally obtained evidence outweighed the benefit
of admitting it. 79
A second assumption was critical to the Court's cost/benefit
73. Id. at 3430 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. During a grand jury investigation, Mr. Calandra claimed the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and made a motion to suppress evidence obtained
with a search warrant that lacked probable cause during a search that went beyond the
scope of the warrant. The Court of Appeals held that the exclusionary rule could be
invoked by a witness before a grand jury to bar questions based on evidence obtained in
an unlawful search and seizure. The Supreme Court, however, reversed. Calandra v.
United States, 414 U.S. 338, 340-42 (1974).
75. Id. at 354.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 347, 351.
78. Id. at 354.
79. Id. at 349. The late Justice Stewart suggested that this cost/benefit analysis first
appeared in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). Stewart, The Road to
Mapp, supra note 3, at 1390 n.132. Other authorities assert that this type of balancing
test first appeared in Calandra. See, e.g., C. WHrrBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 203, at
18 (1980).
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analysis: that the exclusionary rule functions primarily to deter
future police misconduct.8 0 Police deterrence becomes the mea-
sure of benefit. Costs will, of course, vary from case to case. In
Calandra, the cost of the rule was identified as impairment of
the historical function and role of the grand jury.8 l The Court
said that allowing witnesses to invoke the exclusionary rule
would impede the pace of trials and interfere with swift justice.8 2
The benefit was defined as the impact of the rule on future
police misconduct, an impact the Court characterized as incre-
mental and uncertain.83 The Court concluded that the costs were
great, and the benefit slight, and therefore the exclusionary rule
should not be extended to the grand jury proceeding.8 4
The reasoning in Calandra reappeared in several cases in
which a majority of Justices declined to extend application of
the exclusionary rule.85 In United States v. Leon, the reasoning
was used to justify an important exception in the well-estab-
lished application of the rule to criminal trials. The Court held
that when officers act in reasonable reliance on a search warrant
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, evidence obtained
pursuant to the warrant may be used in the prosecution's case-
in-chief, even if the warrant is subsequently found to lack prob-
able cause.8 6
80. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
81. Id. at 349.
82. Id. at 350.
83. Id. at 351.
84. Id. at 349-52.
85. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1978); United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
53 (1975).
86. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412. The district court held that the search warrant lacked
probable cause because the information on which it was based was stale, and everything
the police had observed was as consistent with innocence as with guilt. Id. at 3411 n.12.
The facts in Leon are summarized as follows: Mr. Leon employed a man named Del
Castillo. Mr. Castillo's car, with an unidentified driver, was seen arriving and departing
from a house the police had under surveillance. The surveillance was begun on an
informant's tip that drug dealers lived in the house. The police discovered that Del Cas-
tillo was on probation and that his probation records listed Mr. Leon as his employer.
When police checked their records on Mr. Leon, they discovered that he was the subject
of a 1980 arrest in Glendale, California on drug charges. The record included a statement
made by Mr. Leon's companion at the time of his arrest who told Glendale police officers
that Mr. Leon brought large quantities of drugs into the country. Based on this informa-
tion, the Burbank police obtained a search warrant for Mr. Leon's home. Id. at 3409-10.
The district court suppressed the drugs taken from Mr. Leon's residence. Id. at 3411. A
divided panel for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's finding,
and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court. Id.
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The Leon Court's analysis, while borrowing heavily from
Calandra, broke new ground. First, the Court dismissed any
notion that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated
by noting that the fourth amendment has "no provision
expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of
its commands . ",87 Second, the Court cited Calandra for the
proposition that use of illegally obtained evidence "work[s] no
new fourth amendment wrong."88
In the process of discarding two traditional purposes associ-
ated with the rule-fulfillment of a constitutional mandate and
preservation of judicial integrity-the Leon Court set up a pow-
erful dichotomy between the evidence-gathering function of the
police and the evidence-admitting function of the courts.8 9 This
continued acceptance of a fragmentary model of prosecution
derives no support from the Constitution. Courts are govern-
ment institutions and are presumably restrained by the Bill of
Rights, particularly by those restraints associated with the
fourth amendment applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
Third, the Leon Court rejected any notion of a system-wide
deterrence function for the exclusionary rule. For example, until
Leon, higher courts could apply the exclusionary rule in order to
communicate to magistrates the importance of proper probable
cause determinations. Those magistrates who issued warrants on
less than probable cause saw the fruits of their orders sup-
pressed. That communication is now silenced.90 According to
Leon, "the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police miscon-
The appeal was not on the issue of probable cause but on whether a "good faith"
exception should be made to the exclusionary rule when police officers reasonably rely on
the validity of a warrant. Id. at 3412. The Leon majority decided that such an exception
should indeed be made. Perhaps the most startling aspect of the Leon Court's decision to
create a good faith exception is the likelihood that the seizure in Leon was not in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment. LaFave, Rationale and Ramifications, supra note 49, at
911. If the Leon case had been remanded for reconsideration in light of Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1983) (in which the Court relaxed the test applicable to an informant's
tip), as suggested by Justice Stevens, the good faith exception created in Leon would
have been unnecessary. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3447 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 3432. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. LaFave, Rationale and Ramifications, supra note 49, at 906-07; see also In re:
Lance W., The L.A. Daily Journal Daily Appellate Report 425, 428, Feb. 11, 1985, (Mosk,
J., dissenting); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 555 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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duct rather than punish errors of judges and magistrates."9 1
The Leon Court's demotion of the exclusionary rule to a
tool used only to deter police misconduct cleared the way for the
central argument in the Leon decision: that the costs of exclu-
sion in this case far outweighed the benefit of deterrence. The
cost/benefit analysis central to the decision has two problems.
First, the analysis rests on speculative and questionable mea-
surements.2 Second, the Court misapplied its own test.9 3
The cost, in the Court's analysis, rested on the broadly
stated contention that application of the exclusionary rule to
vindicate fourth amendment rights exacts substantial social
costs.9 4 These costs were nowhere measured by the Court, but
included the possibility that, because crucial evidence is sup-
pressed, "some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced
sentences." 95 The Court's own footnote, however, indicated that
there is little or no empirical data to support this broad
conclusion. 6
The benefits of the rule also are not susceptible to precise
measurement. It is difficult to obtain empirical data showing
that the exclusionary rule actually deters illegal police behavior 97
because it is difficult to quantify an omission. Deterrence cannot
be easily observed but is rather inferred from other trends such
as changes in police practices.98 The problems with the use of
empirical data cut both ways, and opponents of the rule are in
no better position than proponents if the argument turns to sta-
tistics: "Those who want rigourous proof must be disappointed,
unless, of course, they have assigned the burden of proof to their
opponents. Then they will be delighted."99 This is exactly what
the Court did in Leon-assigned the burden of proof to propo-
nents of the rule' 0°
Some evidence exists that contradicts the conclusions drawn
91. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3418.
92. See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
93. Id. at 3442 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 3414.
95. Id. at 3413.
96. Id. at 3413 n.6.
97. Movis, The Exclusionary Rule, Deference and Posner's Economic Analysis of
Law, 57 WASH. L. REv. 647, 653 (1981-82).
98. Id.
99. Cannon, Ideology and Reality in the Debate over the Exclusionary Rule: A
Conservative Argument for its Retention, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 559, 572 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Cannon, Ideology and Reality].
100. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3419.
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by the Court. For example, Justice Brennan in dissent refers to
a 1979 General Accounting Office study that indicated that only
0.2 percent of all federal felony arrests are declined for prosecu-
tion because of potential exclusionary rule problems. 10 1 One
commentator asserts that in spite of the exclusionary rule, sup-
pression motions are seldom granted. 102
The Leon Court turned from its empirically unproven "sub-
stantial social costs" to an analysis of the potential benefits of
the exclusionary rule. Because the Court recognized deterrence
of police misconduct as the only possible benefit, it concluded
that the exclusionary rule "cannot be expected, and should not
be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement
activity."10 3 In other words, when the police do nothing unrea-
sonable, there is nothing to deter.104
The Leon Court compounded the problems inherent in any
cost/benefit analysis by misapplying its own test. What the court
actually weighed is the total cost of the exclusionary rule as
applied in all cases against the benefits of deterrence only in
those cases where the police act in reasonable but mistaken reli-
ance on the validity of a warrant. 0 5 At least one commentator
has suggested that this error is significant because "[h]ad the
Court's cost inquiry been properly focused, it would have been
apparent that the relevant costs are insubstantial."106
A more fundamental problem with the Court's cost/benefit
analysis is that costs associated in Leon with application of the
exclusionary rule are actually costs properly associated with the
fourth amendment itself:
It is true that, as many observers have charged, the effect
of the rule is to deprive the courts of extremely relevant, often
direct evidence of the guilt of the defendant. But these same
critics sometimes fail to acknowledge that, in many instances,
the same extremely relevant evidence would not have been
obtained had the police officer complied with the commands of
the fourth amendment in the first place. 01
The Leon Court has placed limits on how this new good
101. Id. at 3441 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. Cannon, Ideology and Reality, supra note 99, at 574.
103. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3419.
104. Id. at 3420.
105. Id. at 3442 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. LaFave, Rationale and Ramifications, supra note 49, at 904.
107. Stewart, The Road to Mapp, supra note 3, at 1392.
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faith exception will be applied.108 In spite of these limitations,
however, the Leon decision creates an exception to the exclu-
sionary rule that may also be understood as an exception to the
application of the fourth amendment. The privacy interests once
protected by the fourth amendment are now guarded, if at all,
by state constitutional provisions construed to provide greater
protection for privacy rights than are now afforded by the fed-
eral constitution.
IV. WASHINGTON'S INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 7
Most states have constitutional provisions that protect pri-
vacy rights; many of these provisions use language similar or
identical to the language of the fourth amendment.1"1 Under the
Washington Constitution, privacy rights are protected by an
unusually phrased provision: "No person shall be disturbed in
his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law."' 110 In spite of the obvious difference in language, article I,
section 7 was, for the better part of this century, interpreted as
guaranteeing the same rights as the fourth amendment."' After
only a slight delay,'1 2 Washington courts adopted the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Weeks," 3 and, until the mid-
108. An officer's reliance on a warrant is not objectively reasonable when he knows
his affidavit contains falsehoods, when he knows the magistrate is merely acting as a
rubber stamp, when he knows the affidavit lacks probable cause, or when the warrant is
facially deficient. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421-23.
109. See supra note 18.
110. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
111. See, e.g., Seattle v. See, 62 Wash. 2d 475, 478-79, 408 P.2d 262, 264 (1965) (the
court acknowledged the difference in language between the provisions but regarded the
provisions as serving the same purpose); State v. Miles, 29 Wash. 2d 921, 926, 190 P.2d
740, 743 (1948) ("It will be observed that the fourth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, and Art. I, § 7, of our state constitution, although they vary slightly in
language, are identical in purpose and substance."); State v. Sanders, 8 Wash. App. 306,
309, 506 P.2d 892, 895 (1973) ("and because the constitutional right secured by article 1,
section 7 is the same constitutional right secured by the Fourth Amendment, we will
discuss the validity of the search in terms of the Fourth Amendment.").
112. The Weeks decision was made in 1914, and Washington state courts accepted it
in 1922. See infra note 113.
113. State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 184, 203 P. 390, 395 (1922). This case was
decided just eight years after the Weeks decision had created the exclusionary rule and
applied it to all criminal trials in federal courts. In a scenario worthy of the wild west,
Mr. Gibbons drove peaceably into Ritzville one day and was observed by the local sher-
iff, who thought Gibbons might be selling illegal whiskey. The sheriff told his deputy to
get a warrant, but apparently the sheriff was too impatient to wait. He pulled out his
gun, jumped onto the running board of Gibbons' car, and ordered Gibbons to drive to
the sheriff's office. Not surprisingly, Gibbons complied. Whiskey was later discovered
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1970s, the courts of this state continued to assert that the state
and federal provisions marked the same boundaries and defined
the same right.114
The current shift in Washington is toward a careful consid-
eration of state constitutional provisions in general and in article
I, section 7 in particular. 1 The state supreme court has recog-
nized that in the past, blind adherence to federal law has been
to the neglect of state law. 1 6 Further, federal constitutional
rights, as interpreted by federal courts, are now understood to
define the minimum protections available to all citizens. 1 7 The
proposition that "state courts have the power to interpret their
state constitutional provisions as more protective of individual
rights than the parallel provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion" is well established. 8 Finally, there are sound jurispruden-
tial reasons for turning to a state constitutional provision first
when both a state and a federal provision may be applicable. 1 9
concealed in the car. The state supreme court ruled that this evidence should have been
excluded and granted Mr. Gibbons a new trial.
114. See, e.g., State v. Fields, 85 Wash. 2d 126, 130, 530 P.2d 284, 286 (1975);
("What is that right? It is that of protection against unreasonable search and seizure,
made without probable cause. . . . The boundaries of the right are the same under the
Fourth Amendment as under Const. art. 1, § 7."); see also infra note 111.
115. See, e.g., State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 108-112, 640 P.2d 1061, 1070-72
(1982) (court devoted an entire section of its opinion to the proposition that Art. I, sec-
tion 7 offers broader protections than does the fourth amendment); State v. Simpson, 95
Wash. 2d 170, 177-81, 622 P.2d 1199, 1204-06 (1980) (court analyzed at some length the
"ample basis for interpreting Const. art. 1, § 7 as more protective than the federal
constitution.").
116. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 699, 674 P.2d 1240, 1247 (1983).
117. State v. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 49, 578 P.2d 527, 529 (1978).
118. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d at 177, 622 P.2d at 1204; see also Utter, The Right to
Speak, Write and Publish Freely: State Constitutional Protection Against Private
Abridgment, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 157 (1985); Linde, First Things First, supra note
17, at 395.
119. Interpretations of state constitutional provisions independent of interpreta-
tions of similar provisions in the federal constitution should not be seen as merely a way
to get around current Supreme Court decisions. There are sound reasons why a state
constitutional provision should be considered before the comparable provision in the fed-
eral constitution.
First, as a basic rule of self-respect, a state court should consider its own applicable
law first. Linde, First Things First, supra note 17, at 383. Second, consideration of state
law first promotes judicial economy by bringing cases to faster resolution: "If the state in
fact has a law protecting some claimed right, the law should be followed, and if it applies
to the case, there is no federal question." Id. at 392. In Washington, state court consider-
ation of an independent interpretation is a duty. Alderwood Ass'n v. Washington Envtl.
Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 238-39, 638 P.2d 108, 113 (1981).
Third, some states' bills of rights predate the federal Bill of Rights and, until the
federal Bill of Rights was applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
United States v. Leon
The exclusionary rule, under article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution, can be interpreted as serving several
distinct purposes. The authority for this proposition is prece-
dent, the plain language of the text, and the intent of the fram-
ers. Of these three authorities, recent case law provides the
clearest and strongest support.
The Washington Supreme Court in State v. White12 0 con-
sidered a case exactly on point with Michigan v. DeFillippo,12 1 a
case in which the United States Supreme Court created an early,
limited "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. The
Supreme Court held in DeFillippo that evidence obtained by a
police officer pursuant to an arrest under an ordinance later
found to be unconstitutional is not subject to the exclusionary
rule.'2 The Detroit ordinance under consideration in DeFillippo
was a "stop and identify" statute subsequently found to be
unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, a violation of the four-
teenth amendment's guarantee of due process. An arrest under
the ordinance was unconstitutional, and arguably a search and
seizure incident to that illegal arrest was unreasonable and a vio-
lation of the fourth amendment. The DeFillippo Court said that
the ordinance did not authorize an unlawful arrest or search, but
instead gave the officer the presumption of probable cause to
"state courts decided questions of constitutional rights under their own state constitu-
tions." Linde, First Things First, supra note 17, at 382. State constitutions "were origi-
nally intended as primary devices to protect individual rights." Utter, Freedom and
Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washing-
ton Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PuGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 497 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Utter, Freedom and Diversity]. Justifications which place state constitutions first in time
arguably support the logic of turning to state constitutional provisions first for consider-
ation. Linde, First Things First, supra note 17, at 382.
The responsibility for articulating an independent interpretation is a heavy one.
Washington judges and state lawyers alike are in uncharted waters when they embark on
an independent interpretation. Utter, Freedom and Diversity, at 504-05. For example,
they confront problems of construction such as framers' intent, which they may never
have had to consider before. Id. at 511-21. It has been suggested that "the intent to be
determined is that of the people who ratified the document [i.e., the electorate] rather
than the intent of the handful of men who wrote it." Id. at 511. This suggestion indicates
that traditional methodologies for interpreting the federal constitution may have little
application in the area of state constitutional interpretation.
State court activism in this area requires of judges more attention to detail than
time may permit. The relative responsiveness of an elected judiciary to the political pro-
cess makes judges who pursue independent interpretations vulnerable to political opin-
ion. Id. at 495-96; see infra note 144.
120. 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).
121. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
122. Id. at 39.
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arrest or search or both.
In White, the evidence in question was taken from the
defendant during an arrest made pursuant to a "stop and iden-
tify" statute which, like the ordinance in DeFillippo, was pro-
nounced unconstitutional. Allen White was arrested under a
local law that made it a misdemeanor to obstruct a public ser-
vant by failing to provide true information lawfully requested by
that public servant. The trial court found the relevant sections
of the ordinance unconstitutionally vague, invalidated White's
arrest, and granted White's motion to suppress both the goods
seized from him pursuant to his arrest and the confession he
made after his arrest. 23 The fact patterns in White and DeFil-
lippo are strikingly similar. The White court, however, refused
to accept DeFillippo as the controlling law of the case."' The
White court found three justifications for rejecting DeFillippo.
First, the court found that the Washington ordinance under
review was flagrantly unconstitutional."15 Second, the conduct of
the officer was, in this instance, unreasonable. 126 Third, article I,
section 7 of the state constitution offers greater protections to
the defendant than does the fourth amendment, as the amend-
ment was interpreted at that time by the United States
Supreme Court."27
The White court specifically accepted the proposition that
the exclusionary rule is an essential part of the article I, section
7 privacy right it enforces."28 The White court refused to permit
the protection of individual privacy conferred by the state con-
stitutional provision to be selectively abridged wherever the
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation thereof would serve
no deterrent function." 9 According to the court, article I, section
7 "clearly recognizes an individual's right to privacy with no
express limitations."'' 30 The court concluded: "The important
place of the right to privacy in Const. art. 1, § 7 seems to us to
require that whenever the right is unreasonably violated, the
123. White, 97 Wash. 2d at 95, 640 P.2d at 1063.
124. Id. at 102, 640 P.2d at 1067.
125. Id. at 103, 640 P.2d at 1067.
126. Id. at 105-06, 640 P.2d at 1068-69. By contrast, the DeFillippo Court found
that the arresting officer had acted as a reasonable, prudent person under the circum-
stances. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37.
127. White, 97 Wash. 2d at 108-09, 640 P.2d at 1070-71.
128. Id. at 111-12, 640 P.2d at 1071-72.
129. Id. at 109-10, 640 P.2d at 1070-71.
130. Id. at 110, 640 P.2d at 1071.
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remedy must follow."' 3 ' Where the exclusionary rule is deemed
an essential part of article I, section 7 rights, its application.can
be regarded as a "moral imperative.""'3 The exclusionary rule
serves a moral purpose and is "legally necessary to uphold and
vindicate the underlying privacy guarantee' ' 33 of article I, sec-
tion 7. The White court emphasized that the function of the
exclusionary rule is to protect personal rights rather than . ..
[to curb] government action,' ' 34 thus illustrating both the
court's commitment to application of the rule as a moral princi-
ple and the court's rejection of the narrow deterrence rationale
repeatedly articulated by the Supreme Court.
The White court recognized as legitimate the deterrent
function of the exclusionary rule,' 35 but the court viewed deter-
rence in a broad, systemic sense. The court suggested that appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule in the instant case would deter
the legislature from passing unconstitutional "stop and identify"
statutes in the future and that deterring legislative conduct
through application of the exclusionary rule "is as essential as
deterring police action."'3 6 The White court also acknowledged
the preservation of judicial integrity as a purpose served by
application of the rule and specifically noted the absence of this
purpose from the Supreme Court's analysis in DeFillippo.'37
The court's rejection of a narrow deterrence rationale and
acceptance of the idea that judicial integrity should be promoted
through application of the rule support the inference that the
White court considered a prosecution according to a unitary
model.' 8
Whatever the philosophical underpinnings of the White
court's analysis, the interpretation of the exclusionary rule
under article I, section 7 has not resulted in an uncritical appli-
cation of the rule. Shortly after the White decision, the Wash-
ington State Supreme Court held, in State v. Bonds, 39 that a
131. Id.
132. Adams & Nock, Salvucci to Simpson, supra note 11, at 29.
133. Id. at 28.
134. White, 97 Wash. 2d at 110, 640 P.2d at 1071.
135. Id. at 111-12, 640 P.2d at 1072.
136. Id. at 108, 640 P.2d at 1070.
137. Id. at 109 n.8, 640 P.2d at 1070 n.8.
138. See supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
139. 98 Wash. 2d 1, 653 P.2d 1024 (1982) (Washington state police arrested a juve-
nile suspect in Oregon and returned him to the state of Washington where he was
charged with first degree murder, rape, and burglary.).
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violation of Oregon law by Washington police officers, though
obviously illegal, did not rise to the level of a violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights under either federal or state
constitutions and, therefore, the exclusionary rule did not
apply."10 The Bonds court observed, "When evidence is obtained
in violation of the defendant's constitutional immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures, there is no need to balance
the particular circumstances and interests involved.""' This lan-
guage emphasizes the idea that the exclusionary rule may oper-
ate as a moral imperative inseparable from the fundamental
guarantee it promotes. Conversely, when a right is not of consti-
tutional magnitude, the exclusionary rule may not protect it."'
The application of the exclusionary rule in White was
grounded explicitly on the court's interpretation of article I, sec-
tion 7.143 The court's reliance on the state constitution estab-
lishes the adequate and independent state grounds necessary to
insulate the decision from federal review."'
140. Id. at 14, 653 P.2d at 1032.
141. Id. at 11, 653 P.2d at 1030.
142. The Bonds court used a balancing test to determine if the exclusionary rule
applied and found that no constitutional right had been violated. Id. at 10-14, 653 P.2d
at 1030. Although the court did not apply the exclusionary rule, it reserved the right to
do so in the future if police officers did not accept the court's command that they comply
with the laws of neighboring states. Id. at 15, 653 P.2d at 1032.
143. White, 97 Wash. 2d at 11-12, 640 P.2d at 1031.
144. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify the doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds. The Court found that
the "ad hoc method of dealing with cases that involve possible adequate and indepen-
dent state grounds is antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is required when sen-
sitive issues of federal-state relations are involved." Id. at 1039. Accordingly, the Court
required that a state court make "a plain statement that a decision rests upon adequate
and independent state grounds . I..." d  at 1042. The "plain statement" rule specifi-
cally requires that state courts make clear that the use of federal precedents in an opin-
ion decided on the basis of state law is for guidance only and does not compel the result.
Id. at 1041.
The state court's interpretation of article I, section 7 may be protected from federal
review, but the interpretation is not protected from legislative or electoral review. House
Joint Resolution No. 11 was first placed before the regular session of the 49th Legisla-
ture of the State of Washington in February 1985. This resolution, nicknamed the
"Ringer Amendment," called for a constitutional amendment to article I, section 7 that
would make the language of article I, section 7 identical with the language of the fourth
amendment. The proposal would also limit the role of state courts in interpreting article
I, section 7. The "Ringer Amendment" provided as follows:
This right shall be construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court. No court shall have the authority to order suppression of evi-
dence on grounds that such evidence was obtained in violation of this section if
such evidence would not be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States v. Leon
Subsequent cases have found White to be authority for the
proposition that the application of the exclusionary rule under
article I, section 7 serves at least three purposes: "[F]irst, and
most important, to protect privacy interests of individuals
against unreasonable governmental intrusions; second, to deter
the police from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; and
third, to preserve the dignity of the judiciary by refusing to con-
sider evidence which has been obtained through illegal
means." 4 5
White and the cases that have relied on it are not the only
authority that supports a broadly applied exclusionary rule.
There is some textual authority for asserting that article I, sec-
tion 7 supports a more broadly applied exclusionary rule. The
language of article I, section 7 protects the individual's "private
affairs," a phrase that arguably covers a wider spectrum of pri-
vacy interests than does the language of the fourth amend-
ment."'What the delegates at the Washington State Constitu-
tional Convention intended when they adopted article I, section
7 is unclear. No minutes of the proceedings exist. 47 It is known,
however, that those delegates had an opportunity to adopt the
exact language of the fourth amendment. 48 The proposal was
rejected. 149 The specific rejection of the federal provision indi-
cates that the delegates sought to have the privacy interests pro-
tected by article I, section 7 unrestricted by the language of the
fourth amendment.15 0
United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court.
House Joint Resolution 11. Although this resolution died in committee, the power of
such an amendment, once adopted, has already been demonstrated in other states. In
California, a similar amendment was passed by the voters in 1982. The amendment was
called Proposition 8. In February 1985, the California Supreme Court held that Proposi-
tion 8 had abrogated "a defendant's right to object to and suppress evidence seized in
violation of the California, but not the Federal, Constitution." In re: Lance W., The L.A.
Daily Journal, Daily Appellate Report, 425, Feb. 11, 1985.
145. Bonds, 98 Wash. 2d at 12, 653 P.2d at 1024, 1031.
146. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510-11, 688 P.2d 151, 153-54; see also Utter,
Freedom and Diversity, supra note 119, at 495.
147. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889 at
vii (B. Rosenow ed. 1962).
148. Id. at 497.
149. Id.
150. Utter, Freedom and Diversity, supra note 119, at 515.
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CONCLUSION
The exclusionary rule has been interpreted under the Wash-
ington State Constitution as serving at least three purposes."'
Both the text of the provision and the intent of the framers of
the provision support broad application of the rule. 15 2 When the
Washington Supreme Court confronts a case in which officers
act in reasonable reliance on a warrant lacking probable cause,
the court will have an opportunity to define further the scope of
the exclusionary rule under article I, section 7.151
The United States Supreme Court in Leon did not address
the question of whether the defendant's fourth amendment
rights had been violated.154 The court focused on whether the
exclusionary rule should be imposed on the particular facts of
the case."' This is exactly the sort of separation of the exclu-
sionary remedy from an individual's privacy rights that the
Washington Supreme Court rejected in White."'
The exclusionary rule under article I, section 7 should be
applied to facts such as those in Leon first as a "moral impera-
tive." The court's analysis should focus on whether use of a war-
rant that was not based on probable cause violated the individ-
ual privacy rights guaranteed by article I, section 7. The Leon
Court's distinction between the evidence-gathering function of
the police and the evidence-admitting function of the courts15 7
collapses under either a broadly applied deterrence rationale or
under any concept of judicial integrity.
There is no danger that the analysis in Leon or the "good
151. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
153. It has been argued that had Leon been reconsidered in light of Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1983), no fourth amendment violation would have been found. See supra
note 86. The Washington Supreme Court has emphatically declared its rejection of Gates
and its continued reliance on the more stringent two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test of
whether an informant's tip may provide probable cause for a warrant. State v. Jackson,
102 Wash. 2d 432, 443, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (1984). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had
found in Leon that the affidavit used to obtain the warrant included stale information
and failed to establish the credibility of the informant. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3411. The
Court of Appeals concluded that the information given by the informant failed both
prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Id. The independent investigation by police failed to
cure the problems with the informant's information. Id. In a case factually similar to
Leon, the Washington Supreme Court is likely, on the basis of Jackson, to arrive at a
finding similar to the Ninth Circuit's finding in Leon.
154. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
155. Id.
156. State v. White, 97 Wash. 92, 110, 640 P.2d 1061, 1071 (1982).
157. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3432 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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faith" exception it created could be accepted under current arti-
cle I, section 7 jurisprudence. When a case like Leon does come
before this state's supreme court, the court should use the
opportunity to further elaborate and refine the several purposes
served by the exclusionary rule under article I, section 7 of the
Washington State constitution.
Catherine Cruikshank
